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Abstract
We discuss a model of a job market where firms announce salaries.
Thereupon, they decide through the evaluation of a productivity test
whether to hire applicants. Candidates for a job are locked in once
they have applied at a given employer. Hence, such a market exhibits a
specific form of the bargain-then-ripoff principle. With a single firm,
the outcome is efficient. Under competition, what might be called
“positive selection” leads to market failure. Thus our model provides
a rationale for very small employment probabilities in some sectors.
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1 Introduction
Why do most job interviews end up without an agreement? In a recent study
on the Swiss market for skilled labor, Blatter, Muehlemann, and Schenker
(2012) establish that firms interview an average of 4.8 applicants to fill a
single vacancy. Similar results are available for other countries.1 In areas
such as finance and consulting, the percentage of applicants that are actu-
ally offered positions is even considerably smaller. As Rivera (2011) points
out, “elite professional service firms often receive thousands or even tens of
thousands of applications for fewer than two hundred spots, yielding admis-
sions ratios at the most prestigious firms that are more competitive than that
of any Ivy League College.” Related to this, Moen (2003) summarizes that
it is a “shared belief in the labor market segmentation literature [. . . ] that
too few high wage (primary sector) jobs are created in the market.”
Observed high-end salaries, on the other hand, suggest that “high-end
labor” is a very scarce resource. Within a simple Walrasian framework, the
salaries prevailing in the mentioned industries indicate a steep supply curve,
that is, a small number of job candidates.
How can these two facts, small acceptance rates and high salaries, fit
together?
We introduce a model where firms first announce their salaries. There-
upon, candidates of differing productivities apply. Finally, each firm deter-
mines a threshold regarding productivity signals, above which it is willing
to hire an applicant. These signals or “scores” can be interpreted as bits of
information which emerge, for instance, in the course of an entry talk.
Using parametric assumptions, we simulate the firms’ selection process,
which in turn determines the applicants’ employment probabilities. We show
that, compared to a Pareto optimal allocation, applicants approach firms
with salaries too high and employment probabilities too low. In particular, we
find an explanation why most encounters between employers and applicants
end up without agreements, even though—or rather because—salaries are
high.
1In an earlier study on the US labor market, Barron, Bishop, and Dunkelberg (1985)
report an average of 6.3 interviewed applicants to fill a position.
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What are the key ingredients of a job market of which the equilibrium
features the afore-mentioned attributes?
Most of the modern labor-market literature is along the lines of Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994). The matching approach which is applied there stands
in a rich tradition of models that include bargaining as a mean of wage de-
termination.2 In contrast to simplifying supply-and-demand considerations,
this branch of search theory is suitable to address issues such as the extent
of unemployment. However, it does not provide a sufficiently explicit charac-
terization of the matching and wage formation process itself. Furthermore,
it lacks to determine the division of the surplus endogenously.
In addition to these theoretical concerns, models with ex-post bargain-
ing are repeatedly contested by empirical work. Hall and Krueger (2008),
for instance, estimate that between a quarter and a half of the workers in
the United States are employed in jobs where wages are posted. Similar re-
sults can also be found in earlier literature.3 Hence, although models with
announced wages exhibit the disputable feature of firms being committed
to ignore counteroffers, empirical evidence suggests that wage posting takes
place to a significant extent.
Theoretical work uses the term “directed search” to describe labor mar-
kets with posted wages. In directed-search models, workers typically face
trade-offs between higher wages and higher probabilities of getting a job.
Thereby, credible announcing of wages generally ensures constrained-efficient
market outcomes, whereas the “constraints” arise from the fact that workers
cannot coordinate their application behavior and, as a result, are forced to
randomly pick some employer. By introducing such coordination failures,
frictions arise in these models as well, but workers are directed towards effi-
2An overview of these models is given, for instance, in Rogerson, Shimer, and Randall
(2005).
3By showing that higher wages attract longer queues of applicants, the study of Holzer,
Katz, and Krueger (1991) implicitly implies that there is at least partial commitment on
behalf of the firms to refuse any kind of bargaining.
Along the same lines is the finding in Wial (1991) where it is described that chronic
excess supply of adequate candidates often coincides with jobs that are ex-ante consid-
ered to be good ones, whereas the notion of “good” includes pay and is often passed on
interpersonally.
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cient applying behavior, since firms implicitly reveal their hiring probabilities
by announcing wages.4
There exists, however, a branch within this literature which stresses po-
tential market failure, arising from the existence of heterogenous applicants.
A series of papers within the framework of Lang and Manove (2003) works
out discretely separated employment rates which are due to negligible dif-
ferences in productivity. Similarily, Moen (2003) mentions unconditional
wage announcements and worker-firm specific productivities as a source of
inefficiently low aggregate production. More specifically, Moen shows that
low-productivity workers jeopardize high-productivity workers to such an ex-
tent that firms are forced to raise their posted wages in order to screen the
market for superior productivities. Although they are capable of doing so, in
a separating equilibrium, the high-type candidates’ employment probabilities
turn out to be well below efficiency.
We adopt a similar idea in the following. But in contrast to the afore-
mentioned work, we introduce two innovations. First, we do not assume
that firms can only hire one applicant. Second, and more importantly, we
take into consideration that, upon being contacted, employers are not fully
informed about their candidates’ productivity. As opposed to existing work
on directed search, we proceed on the assumption that, once a firm is con-
tacted, the hiring process is not yet at its end. However, unlike work within
the matching tradition, we do not assume that the remaining interaction con-
sists of negotiating on the payment. Instead, we find it a more convincing
assumption that job talks are meant to evaluate the applicants’ abilities.
Imagine the following scenario. Firms post their salaries, say on the In-
ternet or in a newspaper. These binding offers are noticed by a large number
4By assuming that firms are price-takers, Montgomery (1991) shows for the case of
a large labor market with identical applicants that employers endogenize the workers’
trade-off between search intensity and wage, which ensures efficiency. Going one step
further, but omitting welfare considerations, Peters (1991) takes into account the effect of
unilaterally deviating firms by considering the limit case of an atomic economy. Based on
these two papers, Moen (1997) and Shimer (2001) introduce heterogeneity concerning the
productivity of vacant jobs and workers, respectively, whereby the equilibrium efficiency
features of the earlier developed models are maintained.
Analogous results, also concerning multiple worker types, are obtained in Coles and
Eeckhout (2000) and Michelacci and Suarez (2006), where firms endogenously opt for
posted wages as opposed to auctions and bargaining.
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of potential employees who reflect on their relative prospects at the differ-
ent firms. Their productivities are private knowledge, but the candidates
know that part of this information becomes revealed once job interviews
take place. Hence, after the candidates choose a firm to submit their appli-
cations, employers obtain additional information about a candidate’s type.
A job interview may be interpreted as a series of tasks, where a firm speci-
fies a performance level which the candidate needs to pass. Only successful
applicants are hired. They receive the salary which was promised at the
outset.
Before firms use job talks as a sorting device, applicants on their part
potentially reveal their type by selecting a particular employer. Thus to de-
termine the beliefs of firms prior to job interviews, we have to examine a
signaling game. Accordingly, the inclusion of incomplete knowledge comes
at the cost of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs which we need to construct.
If firms deduce that lower salaries are rather selected by unproductive can-
didates, no applicant would head to a low-paying job. But why should a
firm—in our case off the equilibrium path—make a conclusion of that kind?
In the course of this paper, we provide an argument which rationalizes such
a structure of beliefs.
Once employers expect that applicants uniformly approach the best-
paying firms, they are willing to outbid their opponents as long as they
will find a mixture of applicants which justifies such sizable salaries. But the
higher the promised payment is, the more thoroughly a firm needs to scruti-
nize its applicants. As only the best are worth their price, most applicants
are left without an employment. Thus we find an explanation for the low
hiring rates we referred to at the beginning.
We organize the rest of the article as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the assumptions of the model. In Section 3, we look at a single firm (a
“monopsonist”) to illustrate the relation between salaries and the employ-
ment rate. In Section 4, we present the results for the competitive case. We
discuss a more general specification of the interviewing process in Section 5.
In Section 6, we provide a comparative statics analysis, contrast the market
outcomes with Pareto optimal allocations, and briefly address policy mea-
sures. In Section 7, we endogenize the firms’ off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs,
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which we impose up to there. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
2 Model
We look at a continuum of applicants (candidates) with a total mass of 1.
θi ∈ {0, 1} denotes the value of the marginal product of applicant i. Thus
each candidate is either productive (θi = 1) or completely unproductive
(θi = 0). Both types have an outside option of 0. There are J identical
firms. To circumvent issues of market power, we let J → ∞.5 We assume
both applicants and firms to be risk-neutral maximizers of their expected
monetary payoffs.
The timing of the game is as follows. In period 1, nature chooses each ap-
plicant’s productivity θi ∈ {0, 1}. With probability q1 = 1−q0, an individual
applicant’s productivity is 1. In period 2, each firm posts an unconditional
salary wj at which it obliges itself to pay accepted candidates. In period 3,
candidates simultaneously select firms. If the expected payoff is the same
at several firms, we assume that one of the most promising offers is picked
randomly. In period 4, each applicant’s score value si is realized. In period
5, the contacted firms decide on which applicants to employ.
Regarding period 4, we differentiate between two specifications:
Scenario 1. si = θi + εi, whereas εi ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ2).
Scenario 2. si =
∑n
k=1 tk, whereas n ∈ N+ and tk ∈ {0, 1}. We define
pi := P [tk = 1|θi] ∈ (0, 1), and assume that p1 > p0.
We discuss Scenario 1 in Sections 3 and 4. Normally distributed score val-
ues enable the firms to accurately control their composition of the workforce.
In fact, from the law of large numbers, this can be done to an arbitrarily
precise extent. In order to overcome this artificiality, in Section 5 we refer
to Scenario 2, where we consider binomially distributed score values. By
doing so, we interpret {tk}nk=1 as a series of tasks which are examined in the
course of a job talk. From the number of successfully mastered tasks, a firm
5As previously mentioned, we also look at the case of a single firm in the preliminary
Section 3, so as to separately study the role of job interviews.
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draws conclusions about an applicant’s type. As the binomial distribution
converges to a normal distribution, Scenario 1 constitutes a special case of
Scenario 2 where n→∞. Hence Scenario 2 is the more general framework.
By µ(wj), we denote the firms’ posterior belief that a candidate who ap-
proaches firms with payment wj is of type 1. If candidates behave homoge-
neously, posterior beliefs of the firms equal their prior beliefs, thus µ(wj) = q1.
When candidates behave heterogeneously, we assume firms to conclude that
the highest accepted offer is only chosen by type-1 applicants, while any
other offer is only chosen by type-0 applicants. For the moment, we take this
(obviously strong) assumption as given. In Section 7, however, we show that
it endogenously arises as the consequence of a standard refinement criterion
(“D1”). By denoting by I the set of firms which are chosen by either appli-
cant type with positive probability, we summarize the structure of beliefs in
Assumption 1.
Assumption 1.
∀j, l ∈ I : wj = wl ⇒ µ(wj) = µ(wl) = q1,
∃l ∈ I : wl < max
j∈I
{wj} ⇒ µ(max
j∈I
{wj}) = 1 and µ(wl) = 0.
3 The Monopsony Case
We first consider Scenario 1 with a single employer. In this case the analysis
of the applicants’ behavior becomes redundant since they have no alternative
to approaching the “monopsonist”. Accordingly, all applicants apply at the
monopsonist, as long as it offers wm ≥ 0. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium,
the monopsonist sets wm = 0, and all candidates end up being employed.
Although this result follows straightforwardly, we proceed by conducting a
step-by-step analysis of the game. The central aim of the following backwards
induction is to focus on the employer’s selection process, and to illustrate the
relation between salaries and employment probabilities.
The Hiring Decision At the final stage, the monopsonist decides on which
applicants to accept. Given it hires an applicant with a score value sm, it
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also hires applicants with higher score values, because ∂P[θi = 1|si]/∂si > 0.
Therefore, the monopsonist’s hiring problem can be reduced to finding the
profit-maximizing sm.
Independently of wm ≥ 0, the employer expects an applicant to be of
type 1 with probability q1 since, prior to the realization of the score value,
nothing about an applicant’s type has transpired. Hence, we can state the
firm’s ex-post profit maximization problem as
sm∗ = arg max
sm
{π(sm)}
:= arg max
sm
{(1− Φ1[sm]) q1 − wj [(1− Φ1[sm]) q1
+ (1− Φ0[sm]) q0]} , (1)
where Φθi [·] denotes the cumulative distribution function of si(θi). The first-
order condition of problem (1) is
q1φ1(sm) != wm(q1φ1[sm] + q0φ0[sm]), (2)
where φθi [·] denotes the density function of si(θi).
The left-hand side of equation (2) is the marginal benefit from increasing
sm: the productive candidate’s density at sm times the ex-ante probability
q1 of such an applicant. The right-hand side of (2) is the marginal cost of
increasing sm: the marginal probability of hiring any applicant, q1φ1[sm] +
q0φ0[sm], multiplied by the salary wm.
By applying si ∼ i.i.d. N (θi, σ2) on (2), we obtain the monopsony’s op-
timal threshold sm∗.
Lemma 1.
sm∗ = 12 + ln
(
q0
q1
wm
(1− wm)
)
σ2 (3)
Suppose, for instance, that q1 = q0 = 0.5 = wm = 0.5. In this case, the
monopsony obtains θi − wm = 0.5 per type-1 applicant and −0.5 per type-0
applicant. Therefore, as long as the marginal probability of hiring a type-1
applicant is above the marginal probability of hiring a type-0 applicant, the
firm wishes to decrease its lower bound sm to accept more candidates. The
monopsonist reaches its optimum by setting the marginal probabilities equal
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to each other. This is reflected in (3), which for the current example reads
sm∗ = 1/2 + ln(1)σ2 = 1/2.
The Choice of the Payment When choosing its payment offer, the
monopsonist takes two effects into account. Ceteris paribus, an increasing
payment lowers the monopsonist’s profit. Through sm∗(wm), however, it also
forces the firm to adjust its composition of the workforce. By scaling up sm,
the monopsonist increases its proportion of type-1 applicants. Equivalently,
lim
sm→∞
q1φ1[sm] + q0φ0[sm] = q1φ1[sm] (4)
because limsm φ1[sm]/φ0[sm] = limsm e(2s
m−1)/2σ2 = ∞. Equation (4) and an
analogous statement for sm → −∞ imply that the monopsonist’s first-order
condition (2) has an interior solution whenever 0 < wm < 1. In Corollary 1
of Lemma 1, we rephrase this condition by turning our attention to corner
solutions. Furthermore, we state an analogous result regarding the impact
of the ex-ante distribution of types.
Corollary 1. In (3), limq1↘0 {sm∗(·)} = limwm↗1 {sm∗(·)} =∞, as there are
either only type-0 candidates applying or wm is prohibitively high. Likewise,
limq1↗1 {sm∗(·)} = limwm↘0 {sm∗(·)} = −∞.
Of course, if the firm raises sm, it does not only affect the mixture of its
workforce but also its size. If the monopsonist sets wm = 0, its marginal
cost, the right-hand side of equation (2), equals 0. This allows it to set sm to
−∞, thus it accepts every applicant. As a result, the monopsonist realizes
πm∗ = q1. We state this result in Corollary 2 of Lemma 1.
Corollary 2. The monopsony sets wm∗ = arg maxwm{πm(wm)} = 0.
Welfare Analysis and Policy From a Utilitarian point of view, welfare
increases in the number of employed type-1 applicants, which in turn de-
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creases with sm.6 By reconsidering equation (3), we see that
∂sm∗
∂wm
= σ
2
wm(1− wm) > 0. (5)
Hence the monopsonist’s behavior is in line with the one of a social planner.
The total surplus is q1.
Before shifting the focus of the analysis to a market with many employers,
we briefly look at potential government interventions in the monopsony case.
Minimum Salary From equation (5), a minimum salary lowers the amount
of hired type-1 applicants. Utilitarian welfare is reduced.
Maximum Salary Since the monopsonist chooses wm∗ = 0, any restriction
from above is without consequences.
4 The Competitive Case
As opposed to the analysis of the previous section, we now consider the case
with J → ∞ employers. As a consequence, we have to deal with a combi-
nation of a screening game and a signaling game. Screening occurs at the
outset: firms try to influence the composition of their workforce by offering
their respective salaries. Signaling occurs subsequently: each applicant faces
an array of salary offers; thus by approaching a particular firm, it becomes
possible to convey a signal. Respecting this setting of incomplete informa-
tion, we use the notion of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (henceforth PBE):
at each stage of the game, agents maximize their payoffs given their beliefs,
which are consistent in equilibrium. Regarding off-the-equilibrium-path be-
liefs, we impose Assumption 1, which we endogenize in Section 7. As before,
we proceed by solving the game backwards.
The Hiring Decision At the final stage, each firm deliberates on which
applicants it accepts to employ. Firm j’s decision depends on its salary offer,
wj, and its belief on its applicants type, µ(w). Thereby, w := (wj, w−j)
6The cumulative distribution function of a normally distributed variable is strictly
increasing in its argument.
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denotes the vector of all salaries offered in the first period. That is, upon
observing the entire array of salary offers and receiving a certain amount of
applicants, firm j assesses its applicants to be of type 1 with probability µ(w)
and of type 2 with probability 1− µ(w).
Apart from this, the analysis of the hiring decision in the competitive case
mirrors the one in case of a monopsonistic employer, discussed in Section 3.
As a result, we obtain an individual firm’s optimal threshold s∗j .
Lemma 2.
s∗j =
1
2 + ln
(
(1− µ(w))
µ(w)
wj
(1− wj)
)
σ2 (6)
According to Lemma 2, s∗j increases in the fraction of type-0 applicants,
in firm j’s offered salary, as well as in the variance of the signal distribution.7
Also referring to Section 3, we summarize the limit behavior of s∗j as follows.
Corollary 3. In (6), limµ(w)↘0
{
s∗j(·)
}
= limwj↗1
{
s∗j(·)
}
= ∞, as either j
expects only type-0 candidates applying or wj is prohibitively high. Likewise,
limµ(w)↗1
{
s∗j(·)
}
= limwj↘0
{
s∗j(·)
}
= −∞.
The Selection of a Firm To determine µ(w), we have to consider the
applicants’ selection of employers in period 3. Each candidate i selects firm
j∗ which maximizes his or her expected payoff. That is,
(j∗|θi) = arg max
j
{
wjP[si ≥ s∗j(·)|θi]
}
. (7)
In (7), the probability that firm j accepts applicant i, P[si ≥ s∗j(·)|θi], depends
on the employers belief µ(w) (through s∗j). From Assumption 1, we have that
i is believed to be a type-0 applicant whenever i approaches an employer with
an offer below the maximum offer among all selected firms. Furthermore,
from Corollary 3, such a firm will never accept a positive amount of applicants
whenever it offers a positive salary. As a result, the applicants only choose
among the employers with the highest salary offers.
7As an exception, s∗j is independent of σ2 if wj(1−µ(w)) = (1−wj)µ(w). In this case,
s∗j = 1/2.
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Lemma 3. For θi ∈ {0, 1},
(j∗|θi) ∈ K : ∀k ∈ K : wk = max
j
{wj},
and each candidate randomly picks one of the firms in K.
Given the other applicants go for a firm with the highest salary offer, no
individual applicant wants to be exposed as being of the low productivity
type 0. Similarly, if some candidates select a firm which does not belong to
the set of firms with the highest offer, there is an incentive for each applicant
to go for the highest offer and to be declared as being of type 1.
The Choice of the Offered Salary Being aware of the subsequent equi-
librium behavior, in the initial state each firm j offers salary wj in order to
maximize its expected profit. Proposition 1 states that in equilibrium the
maximum offered salary cannot be smaller than 1.
Proposition 1. In the PBE, it holds that
@ŵ < 1 : ∀j ∈ J : wj ≤ ŵ.
The proof of Proposition 1 is somewhat cumbersome.8 In order to un-
derstand its message, it suffices to consider a counterfactual example where
the highest offered salary is, say, 0.99. For the sake of the argument, assume
that all firms offer this salary. As a result, and since we focus on J →∞, an
individual employer obtains 0. By increasing its offer, for example, to 0.991,
an individual firm l can achieve to become the only employer contacted by
the candidates (see Lemma 3). Does such a deviation pay off? In order to
see why this is true, be aware that once the workers have contacted firm l,
according to (6), l sets
s∗l =
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
0.991
0.009
)
σ2,
8Whereas this proof and its counterpart regarding Proposition 2 treat firms as only
being able to choose among pure strategies, extensions to mixed strategies such as done
in the proof of Lemma 3 would be straightforward. We impose the restriction to pure
strategies to ease notation, and because the results are unaffected.
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which is approximately 5.2 for q0 = q1 and σ2 = 1. As a consequence,
P[si ≥ 5.2|θi] '
0.0000001 for θi = 0,0.0000134 for θi = 1.
Thus, by choosing s∗l = 5.2, firm l ensures that its ratio between productive
and unproductive workers is roughly 134:1. That is, for each type-0 worker
which leaves the firm with a loss of 0.991, it hires 134 type-1 applicants, on
each of which it obtains a margin of 0.009. As a result, l’s profit per 135
employed candidates is 134× 0.009− 0.901 = 0.215.
That is, for wj < 1, it is always feasible to steer the ratio between ac-
cepted type-1 and type-0 applicants towards the desired direction. This has,
however, detrimental effects on the employment rate, as we point out in the
following corollary.
Corollary 4. In the PBE, we have maxj {wj} = 1, and both the employment
rate and profits are 0.
Of course, in its present form, this result is too crude to match the ob-
served pattern. In the following, we show that the reason for this lies in the
continuos space of the score values. With discrete score values, any employ-
ment rate is possible, though we approach the result of Corollary 4 the more
we refine the value space.
5 Generalization of the Competitive Case
In contrast to above, we now assume that only coarse signals about produc-
tivity are transmitted. We accordingly modify all so-far conducted steps.
The Hiring Decision Once a firm expects to face µ(w) type-1 candidates
and 1 − µ(w) type-0 ones, it is confronted with the same trade-off as in
Section 4. If the minimum-requirement level sj is excessively high, a lot
of productivity is lost because both applicant types are rejected. If it is
modest, the firm employs too many type-0 candidates on which it loses.
Correspondingly, the higher is wj, the higher sj has to be. In fact, in the
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following we show that in a PBE each firm’s salary offer wj is insomuch high
that only the fulfillment of the highest possible threshold sj = n gives rise to
an employment.
As a first step to seeing that, consider that, in contrast to the above case,
the distinguishing assumption of Scenario 2 implies that the signal of each
applicant can only take on integer values within a bounded set. Specifically,
signal si(θi) follows a binomial distribution and thus assumes the probability
mass function P[si = k|θi] =
(
n
k
)
pθi(1 − pθi)n−k, where pθi denotes the con-
stant probability that an single of n assessed tasks is successfully handled by
candidate i with θi ∈ {0, 1}. In analogy to (1), we state the ex-post profit
maximization problem of firm j as
s∗j = arg max
sj∈N0

n∑
k=sj
(
n
k
) [
(1− wj)µ(w)pk1(1− p1)n−k
−wj (1− µ(w)) pk0(1− p0)n−k
]}
. (8)
Due to the discreteness of problem (8), first-order conditions are of no help
here. Nevertheless, Lemma 4 provides a sufficient condition for s∗j = n,
whereas in the course of the proof of Proposition 2 we point out that the
requested condition always holds.
Lemma 4. Assume there exists a unique solution for s∗j . Then, for µ(w) ∈
(0, 1), we have
∀j ∈ J : wj1− wj
≥ µ(w)1− µ(w)
(
p1
p0
)n
⇒ s∗j = n. (9)
Thus the obligation of paying a high salary wj forces firm j to investigate
more thoroughly whether an applicant is of type 1. Furthermore, if the values
of p1 and p0 are close together, and if there are relatively few type-1 applicants
expected, it is particularly important to let a candidate accomplish as many
assessment tasks as possible.
The Selection of a Firm Regarding the choice of a firm, the former
analysis involving an unbounded and continuous signal space carries over to
the present setting with bounded and discrete test scores. A replicated proof
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of Lemma 3 would merely adjust the probability of being accepted at firm j
in the case of homogenous behavior of the applicants to
P[si ≥ n|si ∼ Binomial(n, pθi)] = pnθi ∈ (0, 1), (10)
leaving the remainder of the discussion unaffected. Therefore we omit a
repetition of the proof.
The Choice of the Offered Salary Again, by choosing a salary wj, firm
j has to take the sequential consequences on µ(w) and s∗j(·) into account.
Proposition 2 provides a simple decision rule for the firms in period 1. It
states that, in contrast to the case of a continuous signal space, the maximum
salary chosen in the initial period can be, and generally is, below 1, even
though it approaches 1 for n → ∞. Since the proof of Proposition 2 makes
use of Lemma 4, we need to scrutinize the condition stated in (9) each time
we apply the lemma, irrespective of whether it is on or off the equilibrium
path.9
Proposition 2. In the PBE, we have
max
j
{wj} =
q1p
n
1
q1pn1 + q0pn0
=: w∗. (11)
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that in any constellation where
the highest offered salary is not equal to w∗ there are incentives for at least
one firm to either increase or decrease its offer. Here, we only sketch out that
there actually exists a PBE which involves a maximum salary as described
in (11). To see this, note that
w∗
1− w∗ =
q1p
n
1
q0pn0
= µ(w)1− µ(w)
(
p1
p0
)n
,
whereas the later equality follows from the random assignment of candidates
to jobs that offer w∗ and Assumption 1 about the structure of beliefs. It
follows from condition (9) in Lemma 4 that, upon offering w∗, firm j requires
its candidates to pass the maximum number of tasks, n. From the binomial
9Otherwise, we would risk running into a circular argument.
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distribution of the score values, the odds of passing n tasks and becoming
employed is pnθi , θi ∈ {0, 1}. Accordingly, each firm’s profit is
(1− w∗)q1pn1 − w∗q0pn0 = 0.
Given all competing firms offer w∗, there is no incentive to deviate by an-
nouncing a higher salary: all applicants would accept the deviating firm’s
offer, and the latter would end up with a loss. Similarly, cutting the offered
salary is useless, as Assumption 1 guarantees that all applicants approach
the best-paying firm in order to not reveal themselves as type-0 candidates.
As Proposition 2 indicates, not all firms necessarily make identical offers.
As long as the highest offered salary equals w∗, each firm obtains zero profit,
regardless of whether it attracts applicants or not. However, for instance
under the restriction of symmetric firm behavior, w∗ is the unique offered
salary in a PBE. Hence, for simplicity, in the remainder of this paper we
assume that in equilibrium wj = w∗ for all firms j ∈ J .
We close this section with Corollary 5 of Proposition 2 regarding the
employment rate and expected payoffs.
Corollary 5. In the PBE, the probability of an applicant of type θi to become
employed is pnθi. Accordingly, the population-wide employment rate is (q1p
n
1 +
q0p
n
0 )/(q1 + q0), and the expected payoff of an applicant with productivity θi
is (pnθiq1p
n
1 )/(q1pn1 + q0pn0 ).
6 Welfare and Policy
Regarding total surplus, it solely matters how many workers are employed
in equilibrium. Irrespective of informational issues, full employment of pro-
ductive candidates can be achieved by enforcing sj = mini {si}, alongside
wj ∈ [0, 1], for each firm j. Such constrained-efficient allocations are also
Pareto optimal, as is, among others, the monopsonist’s solution.
In Table 1, we compare values of the model’s key variables for both con-
sidered scenarios with the outcome of the monopsonist’s problem. In both
scenarios a monopsonist j chooses a salary as low as possible, and at the
same time it hires as many applicants i with θi = 1 as possible. Respecting
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Outcomes
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Monopsony
Maximum salary 1 ∈
(
q1
q1+q0 , 1
)
0
Employment rate 0 ∈ (0, 1) 1
Fraction of type-1 employees 1 (limit) ∈
(
q1
q1+q0 , 1
)
q1
q1+q0
Producer surplus (applicants) 0 ∈ (0, q1) 0
Consumer surplus (firms) 0 0 q1
Table 1: Comparative statics
the candidates’ individual-rationality constraints which impose wj ≥ 0, these
two objectives are not competing. With wj = 0, all applicants apply at j.
Thereupon, due to sj = mini {si}, all candidates, including the productive
ones, are employed. Regarding the profit maximizing threshold, we have
s∗j = −∞ in Scenario 1 with a continuous and unbounded signal space, and
s∗j = 0 in Scenario 2 with an atomic, bounded distribution. Ignoring equity
considerations due to transfer payments, the monopsony maximizes overall
welfare.
Under competition, the main difference between the two scenarios is that
in Scenario 2 the firms do not have illimitable means to sort out type-0
applicants by raising sj. Anticipating this, they are not willing to set their
salary offers arbitrarily close to 1 in the initial period. Therefore, the odds of
becoming employed are non-zero for both types of candidates. With discrete
score values, the applicants’ surplus is
w∗ (q1P [si ≥ n|θi = 1] + q0P [si ≥ n|θi = 0])
= q1p
n
1
q1pn1 + q0pn0
(q1pn1 + q0pn0 ) = q1pn1 .
Accordingly, overall welfare is higher for values of p1 closer to 1 and a lower
number of testing criteria n. That is, the coarser the firms’ framework for the
assessment of the candidates, the more likely it is that candidates withstand
even the highest classification requirement. This is reflected in a higher
employment rate.
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Policy Since n and, through the difficulty level of the assessment tasks, p1
are parameters which are generically determined within firms, they are no
adequate means of regulation. It is, however, plausible that policy-makers
restrict the range of wj. In fact, it is easy to see that by upwards restricting
wj ≤ w, any measure of unemployment can be eliminated by appropriately
choosing w. Thus in our stylized model, lowering w from its equilibrium value
leads to a Pareto improvement, because firms become enabled to extract a
positive profit, whereas an applicant of type θi obtains wP[si ≥ s∗j(w)|θi].
The preference ordering of firms and applicants over possible values of w,
however, is not aligned. Consider Scenario 1. Regarding firm j’s profit,
πj(w) =
(
1− Φ1[sj(w)]
) q1
J
− w
[(
1− Φ1[sj(w)]
) q1
J
+
(
1− Φ0[sj(w)]
) q0
J
]
,
we apply the regular envelope theorem to see that the impact of an increase
in w on j’s payoff is
∂πj(·)
∂w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
sj(w)=s∗j (w)
= −
[(
1− Φ1[s∗j(w)]
) q1
J
+
(
1− Φ0[s∗j(w)]
) q0
J
]
,
thus strictly negative for all w ∈ [0, 1). As opposed to this, for both candidate
types there exists a clear-cut and positive optimal upper bound on salaries.
Proposition 3. When salaries are restricted by wj ≤ w, for each applicant
type θi ∈ {0, 1} there exists a unique wθi which satisfies
wθi = arg max
w
{
wP[si ≥ s∗j(w)|θi]
}
. (12)
Furthermore, w1 > w0; and type-θi applicants’ payoffs are strictly increasing
in w if and only if 0 ≤ w < wθi.
Consider Figure 1. Each value of w implicitly defines a candidate’s em-
ployment probability. The thick lines in panel (a) thus constitute “budget
lines” for both candidate types. Crucially, the implicit employment prob-
ability decreases in the posted salary, but faster so for type-0 applicants.
Therefore, with any w, type-1 applicants have higher expected payoffs than
type-0 applicants, as we show in panel (b). In addition, the highest payoff is
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Figure 1: Determination of w1 and w0
achieved at a higher value of w for type-1 applicants, as can be seen in both
panels.
Somewhat surprisingly, when it comes to determining w, the preference
order of type-0 workers is better aligned with the preference order of firms.
The only party which remotely benefits from not having a salary ceiling is
the type-1 applicants.
7 Endogenization of Beliefs
In both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, the signaling behavior of the applicants
clearly drives the main results. Specifically, from Assumption 1 it follows
that all candidates necessarily approach the best-paying firm, because oth-
erwise they would—correctly or mistakenly—reveal themselves as being of
the unproductive type 0. Obviously, this is a strong assumption, which we
imposed axiomatically up to now. Thus we owe it to the reader to provide
an appropriate motivation.
In the following, we consider Scenario 1. We examine to what extent two
established refinements for signaling games apply. To begin with, consider
the equilibrium outcome where both candidate types choose a firm k with
wk = maxj {wj} = 1.
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Refinement 1. The “Intuitive Criterion” by Cho and Kreps (1987) eliminates
equilibria where firms asses the probability that an off-the-equilibrium-path
message is sent by an applicant for whom sending it is dominated by the
equilibrium strategy to be non-zero. Accordingly, the equilibrium profile
survives the Intuitive Criterion if and only if the remaining type of applicant
does not strictly benefit from sending the off-the-equilibrium-path message.
In the present model, it only pays off for an applicant to deviate from
the equilibrium strategy (that is, heading for wl < wk instead of wk = 1) if
this induces a higher probability of becoming employed. From Lemma 2, the
employment probability of a type-θi applicant is
1− Φθi
[
1
2 + ln
(
(1− µ(w))
µ(w)
wl
(1− wl)
)
σ2
]
, (13)
which is positive for µ(w) > 0 and wl < 1. Since in equilibrium both candi-
date types have a payoff of 0, the firms cannot exclude either of them upon
receiving such a message. Hence the proposed equilibrium does not violate
the Intuitive Criterion.
Refinement 2. The ‘“D1 Criterion” by Banks and Sobel (1987) is more re-
strictive in as much as it constrains the firms to eliminate types which are
“less likely” than others to send particular off-the-equilibrium-path messages.
That is, upon observing an applicant to approach a firm offering wl < wk, the
firms deduce that the deviating candidate is of the type for whom deviating
is profitable in a higher number of cases, characterized by µ(w).
For wl = 0, irrespectively of µ(w), it does never pay off to deviate for
either type. For 0 < wl < 1, (13) implies that, for both types, the set of
µ(w) which rewards departure from wk = 1 is given by µ(w) ∈ (0, 1). Thus
M1 = M0, and neither is a proper superset of the other. Therefore, we
cannot further restrict off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs, which leaves the D1
Criterion—as well as the Intuitive Criterion—without bite.
So far we focussed on the case where the highest offered salary is 1 and
thus no applicant is employed in equilibrium. However, there are many more
subgames to consider, each of them being a signaling game with a fixed
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distribution of {wj}j∈J . For each of these subgames, we now show that the
beliefs imposed in Assumption 5 necessarily arise under the D1 Criterion.10
Lemma 5. Denote by k a firm with wk = maxj {wj} and by l a firm with
wl < wk in any subgame. Let Mθ be the set of beliefs µ(w) for which
P [si ≥ s∗l (µ(w), wl)|θi = θ]wl > P [si ≥ s∗k(wk)|θi = θ]wk, (14)
where s∗k(wk) is the equilibrium value complying with Lemma 3 and the further
course of the game. Then M1 ⊂M0.
That is, each µ(w) which gives type-1 applicants an incentive to deviate
from their putative equilibrium strategies also induces type-0 applicants to
do so. The same, however, does not apply the other way around.
Consider Figure 2. In order for µ(w) ∈M1, wl must be associated with a
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Figure 2: Relative probabilities of becoming employed
sufficient increase in the likelihood of a type-1 applicant to become employed.
Such a candidate compares the relation of hiring probabilities, indicated in
panels (a) and (b), with the relative wage wk/wl. Specifically, in the proof of
10Accordingly, they satisfy the Intuitive Criterion as well.
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Lemma 5 we show that if the proportion P[si ≥ s∗l |θi = 1]/P[si ≥ s∗k|θi = 1]
exceeds wk/wl, the same must be true for P[si ≥ s∗l |θi = 0]/P[si ≥ s∗k|θi = 0].
In terms of Figure 2, this means that whenever the shaded area in panel (a)
is sufficiently large as compared with the shaded area in panel (b), the same
necessarily holds with regard to the relation between the indicated areas in
panels (c) and (d). Therefore, each µ(w) which satisfies (14) with respect to
θ = 1 also satisfies (14) with respect to θ = 0, but the opposite is not true.
As a result, firm l which offers the lower salary wl infers that its applicants
are likelier to be of type 0. The D1 Criterion then requires firm l to rule out
the possibility of being approached by a type-1 candidate. From Corollary
3 of Lemma 2, it eventually follows that the probability of being hired at
firm l is 0. Accordingly, there are no incentives for either candidate to apply
at lower-paying firms. This justifies the structure of the off-the-equilibrium-
path beliefs which we impose in Assumption 1.
8 Conclusion
In contrast to the existing literature on directed job search, the equilibria
we presented in this paper exhibit tremendous inefficiencies. Due to “D1
considerations”, applicants approach only the best-paying firms. Therefore,
firms incur Bertrand-style outbidding. In retrospect, this forces them to
excessively raise their hiring thresholds, which leads to unemployment.
To be clear, our results are far too extreme for the purpose of interpreting
them in a “literal” manner. For the sake of highlighting a subtle but poten-
tially crucial emergence, we made a number of simplifications. Regarding
future research, it thus would be of interest to address some of the following
issues in greater detail.
First, we assume homogenous firms. This may not pose a problem con-
cerning the analysis of a specific market. However, within a more com-
prehensive framework, applicants would differ with respect to their outside
opportunities including alternative job offers and unemployment benefits.
Once we endogenized their participation constraints, the mechanism which
deteriorates expected employment probabilities might be mitigated.
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Secondly, if we abandoned the imposed dichotomy regarding the appli-
cants’ productivity, we would also have to adjust the firms’ hiring rules and
the specification of their beliefs. Discrete jumps in the value of the marginal
product, which are essential to the discussed phenomena, are more probable
to arise at the less densely populated upper part of the distribution. There-
fore we may suppose that the examined effect plays a more important role
within this range.
Of course, there exists a wide array of other possible extensions, such
as on-the-job search (Delacroix and Shi, 2006), endogenized waging-rule de-
termination (Michelacci and Suarez, 2006), job destruction, multiple appli-
cations, multi-period problems, learning processes, and many more. Incor-
porating these in a model of incomplete knowledge issues serious challenges.
Replacing the normally distributed score values by some easier tractable ran-
dom variables could be an option to counteract formal difficulties.
The above points make clear that our model is intended to serve as a start-
ing point, indicating a potential direction of research, and not as a tool with
predictive power. In its current state, it is neither appropriate for policy ad-
vice. In particular, implications of measures such as a salary ceiling strongly
depend on institutional factors such as the international environment.
We showed, however, that a job-market model with imperfect observ-
ability of type is analytically tractable, and the arising PBE exhibits some
properties which are well worth noting. In contrast to most of the existing
literature, we pointed out that a directed-search equilibrium can be far from
efficient, and that both job-seekers and—even more—firms may be keen on
taking some action. The fact that our model’s “pathetic” equilibrium sur-
vives the D1 Criterion indicates our analysis is more than a mathematical
exercise.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
From
φ1(sm) =
1√
2πσ2
e−
(sm−1)2
2σ2 and φ0(sm) =
1√
2πσ2
e−
(sm)2
2σ2 ,
we write (2) as
q1(1− wj)e−
(sm−1)2
2σ2 = wjq0e−
−(sm)2
2σ2 .
Upon taking logarithms and rearranging, we obtain (3). For wm ∈ (0, 1) and q1 ∈ (0, 1),
sm(·) is well-defined and continuous in its arguments. Furthermore, the expected profit is
positive at sm∗, zero for sm(·) → ∞, and negative for sm(·) → −∞. Therefore condition
(3) is not only necessary but also sufficient for sm∗ being a global maximizer.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 2
The monopsonist maximizes
πm(wm) = (1− Φ1[sm(wm)])q1 − wj [(1− Φ1[sm(wm)])q1 + (1− Φ0[sm(wm)])q0] .
From wm ≥ 0, it is sufficient to show that πm(wm) decreases in wm once we impose
sm(wm) = sm∗(wm) (from subgame perfection). By applying the regular envelope theo-
rem, we observe that, as wm increases, the change in the monopsonist’s profit is
∂πm(wm, sm(wm))
∂wm
∣∣∣∣∣
sm(wm)=sm∗(wm)
= − (1− Φ1[sm∗(wm)]) q1 − (1− Φ0[sm∗(wm)]) q0,
which is strictly negative for any wm ∈ [0, 1).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose to the contrary that for either θi = 0 or θi = 1 (or both) it holds that (j∗|θi) /∈ K
with some positive probability p. If a firm l ∈ L = J\K gets contacted by such a candidate,
it infers from Assumption 1 that µ(w) = 0. From (6), l sets s∗l =∞. Thus it holds for the
deviating applicant’s expected payoff that
p× wlP[si >∞|θi] + (1− p)× wk = (1− p)× wk < wk.
On the other hand, if an individual candidate opts for k ∈ K, the off-the-equilibrium-path
beliefs of firm k ensure that s∗k = −∞ and the expected payoff of the applicant is wk.
Alternatively, suppose that all candidates approach firms within L. In this case,
applicant i’s expected payoff is
wlP[si > s∗l (·)|θi] ≤ wl < wk.
If applicant i deviates to firm k, he or she would (wrongly or rightly) be identified as being
of type 1, thus earning wk for sure.
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Finally, it does not pay to deviate from the suggested equilibrium, as only downwards
deviations are possible. By doing so, a candidate would be interpreted as being of type 0,
thus earning nothing.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Case 1. Suppose to the contrary that ∀j ∈ J : wj = ŵ < 1. For a finite number J of
firms, it holds from (6) that each firm’s profit is
πj(ŵ) = (1− ŵ)
(
1− Φ1
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
ŵ
1− ŵ
)
σ2
])
q1
J
− ŵ
(
1− Φ0
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
ŵ
1− ŵ
)
σ2
])
q0
J
.
As J → ∞, we have πj(ŵ) → 0 for any ŵ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, with a continuum of firms,
we solely remain to show that it is possible for a single firm to get a positive profit by
deviating regarding the offered salary. Since ŵ < 1, there exists an ε > 0 such that
1− ε > ŵ. Therefore, it is possible for a single firm l to set wl = 1− ε and thereby achieve
a profit of
πl(wl) = ε
(
1− Φ1
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
1− ε
ε
)
σ2
])
q1
− (1− ε)
(
1− Φ0
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
1− ε
ε
)
σ2
])
q0
]
.
=: ε(1− Φ1[·])q1 − (1− ε)(1− Φ0[·])q0. (A.1)
We next show that πl(wl) > 0, or, from (A.1),
q1
q0
ε
1− ε >
1− Φ0[·]
1− Φ1[·]
, (A.2)
for ε > 0 sufficiently small. Since limε↘0 {q1ε/q0(1− ε)} = 0, it is necessary for (A.2)
that
lim
ε↘0
{
1− Φ0[·]
1− Φ1[·]
}
= 0. (A.3)
In order to show (A.3), we apply l’Hôpital’s rule, as in the limit both the numerator
and the denominator of the fraction at hand are 0, because for θ ∈ {0, 1} it holds that
limε↘0 Φθ[·] = 1. According to l’Hôpital,
lim
ε↘0
{
1− Φ0[·]
1− Φ1[·]
}
= lim
ε↘0
{
∂(1−Φ0[·])
∂ε
∂(1−Φ1[·])
∂ε
}
= lim
ε↘0
φ0
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
1−ε
ε
)
σ2
]
φ1
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
1−ε
ε
)
σ2
]
 , (A.4)
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By employing si ∼ i.i.d. N (θi, σ2), we rewrite (A.4) as
lim
ε↘0

exp
(
−
[
ln
(
q0
q1
(1−ε)
ε
)
σ2+ 12
]2
2σ2
)
exp
(
−
[
ln
(
q0
q1
(1−ε)
ε
)
σ2− 12
]2
2σ2
)

= lim
ε↘0
{
exp
[
− ln
(
q0
q1
(1− ε)
ε
)]}
= lim
ε↘0
{
q1
q0
ε
(1− ε)
}
= 0,
which is the required necessary condition. In order to find a sufficient condition for (A.2),
we use l’Hôpital’s rule a second time. Specifically, we need
lim
ε↘0
{
∂ q1q0
ε
1−ε
∂ε
}
> lim
ε↘0
∂
1−Φ0[·]
1−Φ1[·]
∂ε
 . (A.5)
The left-hand side of (A.5),
lim
ε↘0
{
q1
q0
1
(1− ε)2
}
,
is positive. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that this does not hold for its right-hand
side, which we rewrite as
lim
ε↘0
{
[(−φ0(·))(1− Φ1[·]) + φ1(·)(1− Φ0[·])] 1ε(1−ε)
(1− Φ1[·])2
}
. (A.6)
(A.6) is negative if φ0(·)(1− Φ1[·]) > φ1(·)(1− Φ0[·]). De novo, we use l’Hôpital’s rule to
show that
lim
ε↘0
{
φ0(·)
φ1(·)
}
> lim
ε↘0
{
1− Φ0[·]
1− Φ1[·]
}
⇔ lim
ε↘0
{
1
1− ε
}
> lim
ε↘0
{ε} ,
which completes the proof for the first case.
Case 2. Suppose now that there are multiple offered wages, whereas ŵ := maxj{wj} < 1.
Consider firm l which offers w̃l such that 0 ≤ w̃l < ŵ. From Lemma 3 it follows that no
worker applies at l, leaving l’s profit to be zero. However, as it was argued in the course
of Case 1, there exists a wage wl ∈ (ŵ, 1), which yields a positive profit. Therefore, w̃l
cannot be a best answer from the beginning.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 4
The first fact directly follows from (1). Then, from Lemma 3, applicants of both types
θi ∈ {0, 1} choose firm j∗ such that
(j∗|θi) ∈ K : ∀k ∈ K : wk = 1.
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In this case, equilibrium belief formation as stated in Assumption 1 ensures that (1 −
µ(w))/µ(w) = q0/q1. Furthermore,
(s∗j |wj = 1) = lim
wj↗1
{
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
wj
(1− wj)
)
σ2
}
=∞.
Hence in equilibrium no candidate will be hired.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 4
From (8), the difference in firm j’s profit between the two cases sj = s ∈ N and sj = s− 1
is
∆πj(s, w) := πj(s, w)− πj(s− 1, w)
=
(
n
s
)[
wj (1− µ(w)) ps0(1− p0)n−s
− (1− wj)µ(w)ps1(1− p1)n−s
]
. (A.7)
By rearranging (A.7), we obtain that ∆πj(s, w) is non-negative as long as
wj
1− wj
≥ µ(w)1− µ(w)
(
p1
p0
)s(1− p1
1− p0
)n−s
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:κ(·)>0
. (A.8)
The derivative of the right-hand side of (A.8), κ(·) with respect to s is
∂κ(·)
∂s
= ln
(
p1
(1− p1)
(1− p0)
p0
)
κ(·),
which is positive, since p1 > p0. Therefore, if (A.8) holds for the highest possible value of
s, n, it implicitly holds for lower values of s as well. That is,
wj
1− wj
≥ µ(w)1− µ(w)
(
p1
p0
)n
⇒ ∀s ∈ N ≤ n : ∆πj(s, w) ≥ 0. (A.9)
From the uniqueness assumption with regard to s∗j , (A.9) completes the proof.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Case 1. Suppose to the contrary that ∀j ∈ J : wj = ŵ < w∗. Independently from the
choice of s∗j , with J → ∞ we have πj(ŵ) → 0, since applicants choose among all firms
with equal probability.
Since ŵ < w∗, there exists an ε > 0 such that w∗ − ε := w̃l > ŵ can be offered by
a deviating firm l. From Assumption 1, all applicants select l and thus µ(w) = q1 and
(1− µ(w)) = q0 (see Lemma 3). From the profit function (8) with sj = n, it then follows
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that
πl(w̃l) = (1− w̃l)q1pn1 − w̃lq0pn0
= (1− w∗ + ε)q1pn1 − (w∗ − ε)q0pn0
=
(
q0p
n
0
q1pn1 + q0pn0
+ ε
)
q1p
n
1 −
(
q1p
n
1
q1pn1 + q0pn0
− ε
)
q0p
n
0
= ε(q1pn1 + q0pn0 ) > 0.
As it is sufficient to show that l obtains a profit by choosing sj = n, the result does not
hinge on condition (9) in Lemma 4.
Case 2. Suppose now that there are multiple offered salaries with ŵ := maxj{wj} < w∗.
Consider firm l which offers wl < ŵ. As before, it follows Assumption 1 (and Lemma 3)
that no applicant chooses firm l, leaving l without a profit. By referring to Case 1, it holds
that there exists an offer w̃l ∈ (ŵ, w∗) which yields a positive profit. Therefore, wl cannot
be a best answer.
Case 3. Finally suppose that the highest offer is above w∗. By denoting that highest
salary by wl := w∗ + ε, it follows that
wl
1− wl
>
w∗
1− w∗ =
q1p
n
1
q0pn0
= µ(w)1− µ(w)
(
p1
p0
)n
, (A.10)
whereas q1q0 =
µ(w)
1−µ(w) results from the random assignment of workers to firms offering wl.
According to Lemma 4, the inequality in (A.10) ensures that s∗l = n at the final stage.
Let the number of firms which offer wl be L. Since for each firm l ∈ L it applies that
µ(wl) = q1L and (1− µ(wl)) =
q0
L , their equilibrium profit reads
πl(wl) = (1− w∗ − ε)
q1p
n
1
L
− (w∗ + ε)q0p
n
0
L
=
(
q0p
n
0
q1pn1 + q0pn0
− ε
)
q1p
n
1
L
−
(
q1p
n
1
q1pn1 + q0pn0
+ ε
)
q0p
n
0
L
= − ε
L
(q1pn1 + q0pn0 ) < 0.
Since each l ∈ L could avoid losses by choosing w̃l < wl, wl cannot be a best answer.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 3
With a salary ceiling w, the threshold for an applicant’s score value at any firm j is
sj(w) =
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
w
(1− w)
)
σ2. (A.11)
By incorporating the subsequent course of the game, we write (12) as
wθi = arg max
w
{
w
(
1− Φθi
[
sj(w)
])}
= arg max
w
{
w
(
1− Φ0
[
sj(w)− θi
])}
. (A.12)
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From (A.11), it follows that the first-order condition to problem (A.12) is
1− Φ0
[
sj − θi
]
= φ0(sj − θi)
σ2
1− w,
which we write as
σ2
1− w =
∫ ∞
sj−θi
φ0(t)
φ0(sj − θi)
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
φ0(sj − θi + u)
φ0(sj − θi)
du
=
∫ ∞
0
e
− u2
2σ2
−
(
1
2 +ln
(
q0
q1
w
(1−w)
)
σ2−θi
)
u
σ2 du. (A.13)
The left-hand side of (A.13) equals σ2 for w = 0, then continuously and strictly increases,
and approaches infinity for w ↗ 1. Meanwhile, its right-hand side approaches infinity for
w ↘ 0, then strictly and continuously decreases, and converges to 0 as w ↗ 1. Since
the objective function is positive at an interior solution, (A.13) uniquely determines wθi .
Since the expected payoff is 0 at both w = 0 and w = 1 and its derivative is 0 only at
wθi , it also holds that the objective function increases for values below wθi and decreases
for values above wθi . Finally, since the right-hand side of (A.13) increases in θi, we have
w1 > w0.
A.9 Proof of Lemma 5
We express (14) as
P [si ≥ s∗l (µ(w), wl)|θi = θ]
P [si ≥ s∗k(wk)|θi = θ]
=: 1− Φθ[κ]1− Φθ[κ+ ∆]
>
wk
wl
,
where it follows from wk > wl that ∆ > 0. Thereby,
1− Φ0[κ]
1− Φ0[κ+ ∆]
>
1− Φ1[κ]
1− Φ1[κ+ ∆]
= 1− Φ0[κ− 1]1− Φ0[κ+ ∆− 1]
(A.14)
implies that
µ(w) ∈M1 ⇒ µ(w) ∈M0.
For (A.14) to be true for arbitrary κ and ∆ > 0, it is sufficient to show that
∂ 1−Φ0[κ]1−Φ0[κ+∆]
∂κ
> 0 ⇔ ∂ {ln (1− Φ0[κ])− ln (1− Φ0[κ+ ∆])}
∂κ
> 0.
Otherwise put,
∂
∫ κ+∆
κ
∂ ln(1−Φ0[t])
∂t dt
∂κ
=
∂
∫∆
0
∂ ln(1−Φ0[κ+u])
∂u du
∂κ
< 0. (A.15)
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(A.15) necessarily holds if
∂ ∂ ln(1−Φ0[κ+u])∂u
∂κ
=
∂ −φ0[κ+u]1−Φ0[κ+u]
∂κ
< 0. (A.16)
(A.16) needs to be true for any κ, thus equivalently we can show that
∂ −φ0[κ]1−Φ0[κ]
∂κ
< 0. (A.17)
Since in
−φ0[κ]
1− Φ0[κ]
= −
(∫ ∞
κ
φ0(t)
φ0(κ)
dt
)−1
= −
(∫ ∞
0
φ0(u+ κ)
φ0(κ)
du
)−1
= −
(∫ ∞
0
e−
u2
2σ2
−κu
σ2 du
)−1
,
for a fixed u > 0, each integrand is strictly decreasing in κ, the same holds for the negative
of the inverse of the integral.
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